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By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus.*

A State without the means of change is without the means of its conservation.—*Edmund Burke.*

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THE Conference on Christian Politics, Economics, and Citizenship had behind it a long period of careful preparation, and has in front of it a vast amount of further thought and effort. Unless this is clearly recognized, any estimate of what was actually accomplished in a week's strenuous discussion at Birmingham must prove misleading.

The fifteen hundred delegates, representing practically all Christian Churches and denominations with the exception of the Roman Church, who came together from many parts of the world, did not believe themselves possessed of any quick and easy solution of the intricate problems with which they were confronted. At the same time, while differing on a multiplicity of important questions, they were in whole-hearted agreement as to the fundamental basis upon which any adequate structure of thought and action, having as its purpose the betterment of human conditions, must be built up. 'The Basis of the Conference is the conviction that the Christian faith, rightly interpreted and consistently followed, gives the vision and power essential for solving the problems of to-day.' By that conviction the Conference was held together. First and foremost the problem of C.O.P.E.C. was and is a problem of interpreting the mind of Christ, of seeing the modern world through the eyes of God, of seeking the effective means whereby the spirit of the living Christ may become incarnate in the complex fabric of our social, industrial, political and international life. Men can-

not live in isolation even if they would, and the community is the necessary practice ground of the Christian virtues. Our problems are not merely the problems of the individual, they are corporate, social, world-wide. The supreme task of humanity is the task of 'living together,' and the individual is not a member of one group only, but of many. He has duties not only to his family, but to the State and to the world. Christ must show him not only how to be a good father or a good son, but no less how he may become a good citizen, a good European, a good member of the human race. The gospel of Christianity is therefore a gospel of social relationships. There can be no part of life to which the implications of that gospel do not directly apply; there is no problem to the right solution of which the teaching of Jesus does not make its contribution. Christianity offers us the vision not merely of the perfect individual, but of the perfect world, a world constructed according to the mind of Christ. The belief that in the teaching and spirit of Jesus may be found the solution of all our problems leads logically to the further conviction that 'the social ethics of Christianity have been greatly neglected by Christians with disastrous consequences to the individual and to society, and that it is of the first importance that these should be given a clearer and more persistent emphasis.' Since one of the avowed aims of the Churchmen's Union is 'to study the application of Christian principles and ideals to the whole of our social life,' the promoters of C.O.P.E.C. may well look to readers of the *Modern Churchman* for a full measure of sympathy and support.

The reports of the twelve Commissions, copies of which were in the hands of delegates some time before the opening of the Conference, offer a substantial contribution to the vital task of learning to understand modern conditions, and their careful study by large numbers of intelligent Christians is an essential preliminary to any practical outcome of the Conference. The surveys and suggestions which the reports contain cover a vast field, and give evidence of much hard and clear thinking on the part of the compilers. If C.O.P.E.C. itself may be rightly termed an audacious experiment in 'co-operative discipleship,' the reports provide a no less remarkable example of what Dr. David aptly described as 'team work in thought'

Taken together they attempt to embrace the entire complex of human relationships, and their distinctive value lies precisely in this, that now an endeavour has at last been made to see all our problems as a whole, and in their true relation to one another as integral parts of the world's corporate life. To this end the reports have dealt with Education, the Home, the Relation of the Sexes, Leisure, the Treatment of Crime, International Relations, War, Industry and Property, Politics and Citizenship, and the Social Function of the Church. There is an introductory report (a valiant attempt at interdenominational theology!), having as its subject 'The Nature of God and His Purpose for the World,' and a supplementary volume containing valuable historical illustrations of the social effects of Christianity over a period of nearly two thousand years. The primary purpose of the Conference was to introduce these reports, to provide opportunity, as far as time allowed, for their adequate discussion, and to accept or reject certain general resolutions appended to them.

Of the actual days of conference much might be written. Attendance at three full sessions a day was an exacting business. Floods of talk were inevitable, and with much that was said it would be easy enough to disagree. In an assembly of fifteen hundred persons nothing else was to be expected. Neither the crank nor the bore was absent. Not a few speakers found difficulty in keeping to the point, and of some it might be said that they contributed little or nothing to our knowledge or edification. Many had their own special axes to grind, and ground them unblushingly and with a surprising lack of trepidation in addressing so vast and (as some assured us) so distinguished an audience. The remarkable fluency, especially of some of the lady speakers, left us at times a little dazed and breathless. All this and more might be said by way of criticism. But criticism of this type is singularly superficial and beside the point in view of the wonderfully high level of speaking generally maintained. We were seldom conscious of the presence of those 'perfervid zealots,' to whose frenzied utterances a bishop, whose love for C.O.P.E.C. is small, had warned us that we should have to listen. Indeed an essential sanity of outlook, combined with a frank determination to act effectively where action is obviously called for, might well be selected as the dis-

tinctive features of the debates. Naturally enough there was an abundance of plain and even emphatic speaking, and differences of opinion were honestly and at times bluntly expressed. But for the most part the atmosphere was of such a character as 'to generate light rather than heat,' and the consciousness of fellowship in fundamentals was seldom lost. Alike in the reports and in the discussions a truly surprising measure of agreement displayed itself, and in reading accounts in the Press, or indeed an article of this kind, in which from the nature of the case certain points only can be selected for notice, the existence of this vast tract of common ground, as to which detailed discussion was unnecessary because essential unanimity already existed, must be borne constantly in mind if false impressions are to be avoided.

No report will be found of greater value than that which deals with Education. It contains a really masterly summary of present abuses and much needed reforms. And we may perhaps regret that the first day's conference, before (so to speak) the delegates had got into their stride, was devoted to its discussion. The report stresses emphatically the need for a truer sense of vocation and a higher standard of efficiency among teachers, and has much to say about the necessity for a genuine element of continuity at all stages of education, from nursery to University. It condemns strongly the present apathy of many in face of the educational problem, the hampering influence of class distinctions, the unwieldy size of classes in elementary schools, and urges that 'education should be a first charge on the nation's finances.' There is a courageous appeal for a more intelligent teaching of the Bible, for the cultivation in the minds of children of an outlook truly international rather than narrowly sectional in character, and for the provision of really adequate opportunities alike for secondary education and the systematic teaching of adults. The Conference was asked to use its imagination in the attempt to picture what a genuinely educated nation would be like, and then to consider frankly the contrast between what is and what might be. If it be true that intellectually the human race is only now reaching the period of its adolescence, then the possibilities of further advance must be reckoned as almost without limit, and the Churches have no higher task than that of helping to stimulate in their members

a worthy appreciation of the qualities of goodness, truth, beauty and usefulness, apart from which fulness of life cannot be attained.

The problem of the Christian Home, its characteristics and the hindrances to their realization, was adequately dealt with, and the importance of the home as a training ground for wider service strongly insisted upon. With reference to the housing shortage, facts and figures clearly and trenchantly presented by a large number of speakers brought home with a new and terrible urgency the responsibility of individual Christians for a crying scandal, to the existence of which many are still lamentably indifferent. The fourth resolution appended to the report summed up effectively the mind of the Conference on this matter:

> 'Resolved that Christians cannot tolerate the present housing conditions, and that it is the imperative duty of all Christians and all Churches ceaselessly to demand and work politically and otherwise, for measures which will secure (*a*) that such a number of new houses be built as will completely meet the housing shortage and abolish the slums; (*b*) that all families have adequate means of subsistence and the reasonable comforts and opportunities of life.'

During the discussion of the report on the Relation of the Sexes, feeling obviously ran high. While the Commission had agreed whole-heartedly on many matters, as for example the need for a single standard of purity for men and women, the importance of frank instruction on questions of sex, the evil and futility of all State regulation of vice, and the urgent demand for measures of a redemptive character in dealing with the prostitute, opinion had remained divided with reference to divorce and to the control of conception. A like division of opinion was reflected in the discussion. With a few regrettable exceptions the tone of the speeches was all that could have been desired, and the Conference made evident its gratitude to Dr. Lofthouse and Mr. Studdert Kennedy for raising the discussion at the outset to a level of frank speaking and clear thinking, which laid on those who elected deliberately to desert that level a serious responsibility. A supplementary resolution, which the *Church Times* chooses to describe as 'colourless,' but which in point of fact was both courageous in itself, and backed by the most moving speech to which the Conference was privileged to listen, urging that the Church must not seek to stifle

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enquiry into so fundamental a question as that of the control of conception, called forth many champions of the two opposing points of view. It is matter for note that while opinion may legitimately differ as to the comparative merits of the rival positions, the speeches of some who opposed conception control root and branch were marred by a violence and vulgarity of tone, and an unbridled recklessness of statement highly detrimental to the cause which they were intended to support.

The discussion on the Christian Use of Leisure brought the Conference back into calmer waters. The report had considered effectively the twin evils of Drink and Gambling, enquiring carefully into their causes and results, and pleading on the positive side for a saner use of Sunday, increased facilities for healthy outdoor amusement in playing fields and open spaces, and a higher standard of recreation, especially through the avenues of Music, Drama and Literature. The Conference condemned whole-heartedly the gambling methods adopted by many Churches in the raising of funds for their own purposes, and listened with particular appreciation to an appeal for an increased willingness on the part of educated girls to share their advantages with those who were less fortunate.

The session on the Treatment of Crime proved one of the most interesting of the whole series. During the course of the discussion much of our present Criminal Law was frankly branded as un-Christian. The experts present declared the once fashionable idea of a definitely criminal type to be wholly illusory, laying stress on the redemptive motive as fundamental in the treatment of criminals, and adducing the beneficent results of those prison reforms which were part of that motive's visible expression. A resolution urging the abolition of capital punishment as a proof of the delegates' sincerity in desiring the general application of the redemptive method obtained an overwhelming majority of votes. Speakers rightly insisted upon the paramount duty of enquiring intelligently into the *causes* of crime, urging the responsibility which lies at the door of the great body of respectable citizens for our present crime-producing society. Professor Moberly's carefully reasoned statement of the basic principles which must underly any adequate treatment of the prison problem received the cordial approval of the Conference. He urged convincingly the need of pro-

gress from the non-moral level, through the ethical, up to the Christian, warning his hearers of the danger of attempting to jump suddenly from the lowest level to the highest, and attributing our present faulty methods of dealing with crime to the influence, above all, of a reactionary and imperfectly articulated theology.

The thorny and intricate question of International Relationships brought us into a realm of thought where adequate knowledge and impartiality of judgment are notoriously difficult of attainment. The Commission had dealt ably with the main problems, stressing the validity of moral principles in international intercourse, the truth of universal brotherhood with its corollary of mutual assistance, and the doctrine of trusteeship as essential to the establishment of right relations between advanced and backward peoples. Emphasis was further laid upon the need to consider sympathetically the claims of minorities, the pressing urgency of procuring forthwith the right type of teaching in schools on international questions, and upon the duty of the Churches to assist in the creation of an intelligent Christian public opinion in support of the League of Nations. The recommendations appended to the report close with the significant sentence :

> 'Above all is there need that the Christian Church should unceasingly and faithfully explore and, at whatever cost, unflinchingly proclaim all that is involved for international and inter-racial relationships in the Gospel of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ.'

During the discussion Machiavelli and the doctrine of the sovereign non-moral State came in for their fair share of well-merited denunciation, and the Conference was reminded of two facts of primary importance which have been too often neglected : First, 'that profiteering is no more respectable when practised on the foreigner,' and secondly, that 'we ourselves must have faith in the ideals which we desire the rest of the world to follow.' As was fitting, the delegates listened with attention to the speeches of a large number of the representatives of foreign nations, Professor Zilka of Prague delighting his hearers with a well-timed reference to the impossibility of 'isolated paradises' under the conditions of the modern world.

The Commission entrusted with the consideration of the attitude of Christianity to War, while unanimous in condemning

war as an evil, in denouncing the adoption of any policy of persecution towards the conscientious objector in war time, and in urging strenuously the employment of arbitration as a means to the peaceful settlement of international disputes, was unable to agree on the question whether resort to war was in all cases absolutely forbidden to the Christian man. Both in the report and in the discussion the Pacifist and non-Pacifist positions were set forth with commendable clearness and lack of heat. On the one hand the Pacifist emphasized the impossibility of overcoming evil with evil, stressing relentlessly the malign logic of war, in the pursuit of which each side was forced inevitably to adopt and if possible to improve upon, the worst devices of its opponents, and seizing eagerly upon a phrase in the non-Pacifist section of the report, to the effect that all war is contrary to the spirit and purpose of Jesus Christ. On the other hand, the non-Pacifist urged the recognition of the individual's subordination to the community, indicating the difficulty of achieving a consistent level of Christian conduct in a half-Pagan world, and expressing apprehension lest the Conference should commit itself to the acceptance of a number of general statements in condemnation of war, by which it would find itself unable resolutely to stand in the event of future hostilities. Mr. F. E. Hutchinson, of Oxford, did good service by pointing out that to demand a courageous attitude from the Churches in time of peace, or even under threat of war, was insufficient. We must have practical guidance as to the position which a Christian should adopt when war had actually become a reality. Truth, he asserted, was always the first casualty, and every war up to the present had been justified by the Churches of the belligerent countries.

The report and ensuing debate on Industry and Property formed in some sense the crux of the whole Conference. On the one hand there are some, as for instance Dr. Salomon, of Manchester, who from the standpoint of modern Judaism would seek to challenge the legitimacy of such a phrase as 'Christian Economics,' asserting categorically that it is without meaning, and regarding its use as an attempt on the part of the Christian Church 'to monopolise the basic principles of religion in their application to everyday life.' On the other hand, there are many Christians who deprecate what they are inclined to de-

scribe as a regrettable tendency to meddle imprudently with the working of Economic Laws, labelling those clergy who spend time in the intelligent study of social questions as Court Chaplains to King Demos, and even venturing on occasions to repeat the old lie of the nineteenth century to the effect that Christianity is concerned only with the private life of the individual, and has no message for the wider relationships of human life.

Now it may be said at once that the framers of this report hold no brief for mere emotionalism either in the pulpit or elsewhere. But neither do they take refuge in the use of catch-phrases about the immutability of Economic Law. God, they told us, had been largely left out of the Business World. Christians were to a great extent morally responsible for the present chaos. The conditions were of man's making, and accordingly, given the necessary resolution, they could be unmade. Poverty, they said, must go. And poverty could be abolished in a generation, assuming the requisite change in the mentality of the peoples. The world's resources were abundant and steadily increasing. Could we but establish in industry the predominance of the motive of service over the motive of gain; could the dynamic principle of co-operation be made really effective in our business life; could the workers once attain a genuine voice in the management of our industrial concerns, a lasting sense of security in place of the constant fear of unemployment which exists to-day, then the problem would be well on the way towards an adequate solution.

The fourth resolution, which asserts dogmatically that 'the first charge on industry should be a remuneration sufficient to maintain the worker and his family in health and dignity,' contains admittedly the kernel of the whole matter. What if an industry cannot bear that charge? One speaker warned us that in accepting the resolution we were playing deliberately with 'social dynamite.' On the question whether the phrase was justified, opinions may differ. What must be palpably obvious to all sincere Christians is surely this, that a complacent acquiescence in the continuance of any system which renders definitely impossible the satisfaction of the demand embodied in the resolution is reprehensible in the last degree. No civilization based avowedly on the contention that health and dig-

nity are from the nature of the case impossible for the great majority of men and women can rightly claim the title of Christian, and a belief in the inherent necessity of evil conditions is really equivalent, as Dr. Herbert Gray has expressed it in another connection, to militant atheism and a denial of the Divinity of Christ. Students of industrial history will recall how frequently the argument from Economic Law was adduced in support of the continuance of child labour in mines and factories. Such labour was regarded as altogether essential to the continued prosperity of our industrial life, and that the argument was quickly proved to be fallacious should at least warn us against accepting too readily the contention of those who assert in our own day that this or that industry cannot bear the charge of a living wage. While it is of course true that the ecclesiastic must not presume to offer to the man of business any cut and dried solution of all his problems, the Church can and should insist that if Divine Fatherhood and Human Brotherhood are something more than mere empty phrases, no conditions of life which amount to an open denial of their truth are either essentially necessary or permanently tolerable.

The discussion of the report on Politics and Citizenship was mainly remarkable for two things: first, the emergence of a rather pronounced difference of opinion on the nature of the State and the limits within which it can rightly demand the obedience of Christians, and secondly, an elucidation of the methods and ideals of the modern Press. In the minds of some speakers the fact that our great newspapers can come into the hands of unscrupulous individuals who are not ashamed to use the virtual omnipotence thus afforded them for unworthy ends appeared as the master evil of our age, having a directly significant bearing upon all the great problems with the Christian solution of which C.O.P.E.C. is concerned.

The debate on the Social Function of the Church occupied two full sessions, and while throwing up certain suggestions of a practical value, was perhaps scarcely worthy of the report of which it was the outcome. Professor Moberly once again earned the gratitude of the Conference by taking us back to the consideration of fundamental principles. While pleas for the more courageous treatment of social subjects from the pulpit or through the medium of instruction classes were legitimate

enough, while the insistent demand for fuller opportunities for social study in theological colleges would have to be adequately met, while enquiry by the Churches into this or that practical abuse must be strenuously encouraged, there was need above all for a theology which should help men to do their social duty. During the war, said Professor Moberly, the Churches did not speak to the consciences of men with any force whatever, and at the present day their influence in questions of social reform was really negligible. If one asked why these things were so, the answer in both cases was the same. Christians don't know what they think about God; they cannot agree on the vital question of Old Testament ethics, and the extent to which they are binding upon the thought and conscience of the present day; their theology is not thought out; it offers no coherent response to humanity's questionings on matters of crucial urgency. The supreme task before us is the formulation of an adequate theology which may serve as the basis of right thinking and effective action in all departments of human life.

Of the practical outcome of C.O.P.E.C. it is too early to write with confidence. A series of Regional Conferences is to develop the work begun at Birmingham, and (as Dr. Raven reminded us) the immediate task by which delegates are confronted is that 'of making C.O.P.E.C. integral to the life of the Church in their own neighbourhood.' Very wisely the temptation to set up at once a piece of visible machinery has been resisted. Machinery there will be when the time is ripe, and as its general purpose it will have the work of making visible everywhere the unity of spirit manifested in the Conference, and of establishing interdenominational departments for research, for the dissemination of reliable non-party information during the course of social or industrial disputes, and for the setting forth of an effective Christian witness in times of national or world crisis. That C.O.P.E.C. has achieved much is even now evident, but its future consequences alike for our own nation and for the world as a whole may well prove more revolutionary than the most sanguine would at the moment venture to predict.

THE BI-CENTENARY OF KANT

(1724—1804)

By Rev. KENNETH T. HENDERSON, M.A.; Dip. Ed., Chaplain of Ripon Hall, Oxford.

TO revolutionize the outlook of succeeding generations, and with one's name to mark a new epoch in some department of man's work is a privilege restricted to but a handful of the world's great men. Among these must rank Immanuel Kant.

There is an intensely dramatic element in the history of thought. A startling suddenness seems to characterize new discoveries. In Kant's life the profound revolution that he achieved in the world of thought stands in almost ridiculous contrast with the smooth and monotonous flow of his daily life. The good citizens of Königsberg, who used the daily walks of the philosopher as a means of regulating their clocks—like the passers-by who watched Dalton muddying his vesture by the banks of familiar ponds, or those who stared through his window at Spinoza earning a few pence per diem grinding watch-glasses—doubtless spared a kindly and tolerant smile for these men whose outer lives possessed a certain childlike simplicity. They were so obviously not competing for the world's 'good things.' They made no impact on their neighbours' affairs. They let the world pass them by. They were happy in their dreams. For those dreams were 'the ivory gates and golden' opening, for all who had the will to pass through them, into newer and surer pathways to reality.

Kant hardly has a biography. A recent German periodical, devoting its whole issue to him, tries to construct one. It recalls that when Heine commenced to write Kant's Lebensgeschichte, he began by affirming that Kant had neither a 'Leben,' nor a 'Geschichte'; neither a life nor a history.

Yet a study of his career teaches one massive lesson. His life was a consistent piece of work inspired by a profound sense of the revolutionary significance of his task. He had no doubt at all of this, and it gave him a quiet, assured, concentrated energy that is tremendously impressive. The public imagination, then as now, was chiefly struck by the regularity of his

daily walks. They were always solitary. A companion meant talk. To talk meant to breathe through the mouth. This was injurious to the health. It further involved the simultaneous exercise of the intellectual and physical faculties, another very injurious practice.

This would seem to suggest that Immanuel Kant, like Herbert Spencer, found his sole recreation in looking after himself. But we must not allow these trifles to obscure our reverence for Kant's greatness. It can be said with truth that all modern philosophy is a development of some part of Kant's thought, or a reaction from it.

There are two nations whose 'plain men' respect the effort to discover, by a sustained effort of thought, what is man's relation to the universe, and believe that such efforts are valuable for the responsible task of living worthily. These are the Germans and the Scotch. The two streams met in Kant. Not only was his ancestry 'after the flesh' partly Scottish, but his thought took its rise from the philosophy of the Scottish thinker, David Hume. Hume marks the climax of a destructive revolution, Kant is the pioneer of a vast reconstruction.

The Middle Ages enshrined its conception of man and his destiny in a complex system of scholastic philosophy, which reached its classic expression in the *Summa Theologiae* of Thomas Aquinas. In this blending of Aristotle's science with the Church's development of Christian doctrine, a system built up with consummate skill and magnificent thoroughness, the abounding energies of the Middle Ages and its passionate longings for unity found their aims rationalized, and their thought systematized in the midst of political instability. Aquinas enabled them to 'see life steadily and to see it whole.' To carry such an immense superstructure, the assumptions on which it was based had to be of a corresponding breadth. These were inevitably challenged by the critical temper of the Renaissance, for they seemed to impose limitations to enquiry. These limitations lay not in the objects of enquiry, for there was nothing in heaven or earth or under the earth which the mediaeval scholastics might not speculate upon, but in the methods prescribed. Certain premises were fundamental, and might not be questioned, and certain methods were *de rigueur*.

The new philosophy began in a revolt from the mediaeval theory of knowledge. Truth was for these thinkers the correspondence between objects as they really are apart from us, and the ideas of these objects as they exist in our minds. The new critical spirit was not destructive in temper, it was an attempt to build again on foundations which it had laid and tested for itself. Modern philosophy began with Descartes. His ideal was to construct a philosophy not based on dubious assumptions, but on unquestionable and self-evident fact. To do this, he was compelled to find his starting point in the inner life, and the new revolution in philosophy starts with his axiom, 'Cogito ergo sum.' Locke, Berkely and Hume followed, each with a criticism of self-consciousness. Their first enquiry was, 'What sort of knowledge can man get of the universe? What can we know of ourselves and the world?' From this they proposed to discover man's place in the universe, and therefrom to deduce what he ought to do—his duty. This also was Kant's motive. He said, 'The greatest business of man is to know what man must be in order to be man.' All else was preliminary to ethics. But the study of man's nature and place in reality must precede the discussion of his function: first of all must come the examination of his means of discovering what he is.

Kant was, as he tells us, 'roused from his dogmatic slumber' by Hume's denial that truth was merely the correspondence of our ideas with a reality beyond them. He accepted Hume's contention that we could not know reality as it existed outside ourselves. But things as they are must be, he thought, things as they exist apart from us. These must necessarily be different from things as they appear through the medium of our faculties. Therefore we could not know things as they are in themselves. Hume held that all that we could experience was the sequence of sensations as they are printed upon our passive minds. We could not get outside or beyond these sensations. Kant also believed that 'we could not know things as they are, because it is we who know them.' But Kant saw that there were great binding and constructive principles at work in our experience, which Hume's philosophy failed to explain. Hume, for instance, taught that we conclude that one event is caused by another simply because we find them together habitually in the

same sequence. This facile conclusion appeared inadequate to Kant. There is, he taught, a necessity, a binding force about our perception of causation for which habit, with all its uncertainty, could not account. Knowledge is a vast logical structure of universal validity. Truth was the same for all. Yet the nature of our faculties determines the kind of knowledge we possess. The mind supplies the binding and constructive principles. The mass of sensations are arranged by the activity of mind into the world of facts as we know them. In the general principles on which our faculties work, Kant discovered the foundations of the world of knowledge. These general principles Kant called categories. Truth does not vary for different people, he held, because these general principles are universal. Each mind brings to its work the same constructive machinery. But though truth did not vary for each individual man, knowledge could give truth that was relative only to man. From this conclusion of Kant two modern lines of thought diverge. One stresses the fact that each man makes his world for himself. As psychology taught us more about the way we perceive things, it became recognized that a man's interests play a great part in the world he creates for himself. They determine the facts that he selects to attend to; the way in which he combines them into systems; the interpretations that he places upon them. To the man of purely scientific temperament:

> 'Primroses by the river's brim
> Dicotyledons are to him,
> Just that and nothing more.'

Following this line of argument, this school concludes that not only is truth relative to men, it is relative to each individual and to the purposes of each individual. The world as it exists for us is the creation of our aims and interests. This is the doctrine of pragmatism. Its outstanding prophets are the late William James and Dr. F. C. S. Schiller. In religion it is responsible for Modernism of the special type of George Tyrrell's.

Another line of thought originating from Kant's doctrine of relativity is exemplified by Lord Haldane and Professor Pringle Pattison, who believe that our faculties are so constructed as to give us genuine knowledge of reality. They do

not believe that things as they are differ necessarily from things as we know them. We can weigh the world we live in, and measure the diameter of stars hundreds of 'light-years' distant because there is a reason in us akin to the reason in nature. 'Our minds are organic to the universe' in Lord Haldane's phrase. Therefore, they say, let us trust the seemingly non-rational faculties which are native to our being—the intuitive activities of mind, our religious experience so far as its best types converge. If we find, in scientific enquiry, verification for the kinship of our reason with reality, we have a weighty analogy in favour of trusting our religious experience to give us a knowledge of reality too. Kant's enquiry into what man can know was, as we have noted, intended as preliminary to his discussion of what man ought to do. The problem of conduct was for him the supreme problem of philosophy. He limited man's knowledge to the ways in which his mind arranged his sensations for him. The human mind could not know reality. At this point Comte and the Positivists take their departure. If man is subject to that limitation, they say, he had better give up the attempt at a religion which transcends his own life, or claims to bring him into relationship with ultimate reality. Let him confine his attention to ordering this life of his as worthily as possible. Here too Spencer takes his departure, but unlike the Positivists, he thought that the existence of the Unknowable Cause from which all reality had its origin could be inferred, but that its nature could not be known.

But Kant himself was only at the beginning of what he felt to be his main task. He saw clearly that there was much in man's nature that demanded more from the universe than knowledge, according to his theory, could give. The spiritual nature of man must find its own world through its characteristic activity of faith. Faith was practical reason. It was man's guide in the realm of action. It was the energy whereby life grounded its activities in the real world, from the actual knowledge of which it was cut off. But faith was not mere individual choice and caprice. It was practical reason. There were great principles guiding its activities which made its results constant, stable, and abiding. Yet the truth of these conclusions could not be proved.

Faith was the venture by which man passed through the phenomenal world into the real world which knowledge veiled from him. In this world his spirit lived, and faith in God, freedom, and immortality, was the principle by which it lived. His criticism of Descartes' three proofs of the existence of God were not intended to exclude belief in God. On the contrary Kant was concerned to get rid of what he felt to be an unsound claim to the knowledge of Deity, in order to make room for faith in God. Descartes' view of God as the First Cause he rejected, because he held the principle of causation could only apply to the relation between two phenomena, hence the conception of first cause is self-contradictory. The argument from design he rejected, not because he did not recognize its cogency, but because he saw its limitations. It could only establish the existence of a God sufficiently wise and loving to account for the results achieved. Yet beautiful objects and organic life, he felt, must be interpreted by the principle of end or purpose. In them some 'thought' seemed to be expressed.

Descartes' third argument, the one to which he himself attached most importance, was that from the existence of the idea of God in the mind we might infer the existence of God Himself. All our ideas, he pointed out, were made up of elements given to us in our experience. Even the idea of a centaur was made up of the two familiar ideas of 'man' and 'horse.' But where could the idea of God come from save from God Himself? Again, the idea of God was the idea of a perfect Being. Existence was a necessary attribute of perfection. Therefore we must attribute existence to God as a necessary element in his perfection. By the famous illustration of the difference between the idea of the hundred dollars in the pocket, and the feel of them there, Kant refused the right of any idea to guarantee the existence of its object. He also pointed out that to a conception the existence or non-existence of its object makes no difference. Triangles existed as conceptions, and not otherwise. Kant saw clearly enough that the whole question is to whether reality was accessible to human thought was here at stake. On his theory he was bound to deny this. But for all his acute and damaging criticism, these lines of thought have proved capable of re-statement. A careful re-opening of the

whole discussion of these three proofs of God's existence may be found in Professor Webb's *Problems in the Relation of God and Man*. Professor Henderson in his *Preparation of the World for Life*, and Rev. C. J. Shebbeare in his recently-published discussion with Mr. Joseph McCabe have revived the argument from design.

In their modern form, these lines of thought do not claim the status of proofs, but they are not without value as approaches to the problem of religious certainty. Kant's spiritual world is purely moral. Kant's beautiful and almost too often quoted sentence about 'the starry heavens above him and the moral law within,' mark his nearest approach to any aesthetic or mystical feeling. God was necessary, he felt, to his moral universe in order to complete its reasonableness, and to see that justice was done. He is introduced as a distributor of rewards and punishments in order that the righteous may prosper, and the wicked be confounded. Kant did not rise to the conception of morality as an essential element in the relation of God and man. But he believed that goodness and happiness must ultimately be united in a rational universe.

Yet Kant is the great prophet of disinterested morality. The motive of earning reward or escaping from punishment would, he taught, deprive an act of any moral significance at all. The characteristic of judgment that is moral must be its sense of unconditional obligation. That an act might be useful or pleasant to oneself or anyone else did not make it moral. It was the moral reason which revealed what we ought to do. There was no appeal to any other consideration. This is the famous doctrine of the categorical imperative. Emotion must be kept out of the process of moral judgment. Kant here cut a Gordian knot which no philosopher has yet succeeded in legitimately unravelling. His rule, 'So act that your act is capable of being made a general rule by all in like circumstances,' is too rigid to be entirely practicable. Hegel's colossal work, and that of all the thinkers who descend from Hegel, rise out of Kant's view of morality as rational. But Hegel rejects Kant's limitation of what we can know. For Hegel the moral reason was the supreme means of knowing the nature of the universe. Man learnt his nature and destiny by becoming, through a rational process, increasingly conscious of God in him. From Hegel

descend Green, Caird, Nettleship, and the English idealists. We can know nothing outside or apart from ourselves, they admit. But they are not prepared to admit that we do not know reality. This they identify with experience. Reality for them is constituted by the relation of subject and object. Its nature can be learnt by a rational process. Kant's stress on moral reason was a reaction from a whole system of moral teachings which were, he thought, incapable of yielding any firm and constant principles. Neither utility, nor the approval of one's fellows, nor the authority of the state, nor sympathy could account for the firm and imperative deliveries of the moral reason. His stress on this seems to us almost too exclusive, hard and definite. We feel this especially in the manner in which he insists on the disinterestedness of moral action. His severity leaves us with certain difficulties. How far is it permissible to consider the consequences of an act as an integral part of the act itself? How far does the satisfaction of self-realization in right-doing deprive the act of moral value? Kant's treatment of freedom is in a sense a doctrine of justification by faith. That a man should believe in his freedom was, he thought, sufficient to make it effective. Yet the world is as it is as the result of a causal series of events. But our moral reason leads us to condemn some portions of it, which come within our experience, and we accept this condemnation as laying upon us an obligation to put matters right. Thus we feel free, and act as if our wills were outside the causal order of phenomena that we are modifying. We act as if our actions were originating in the real world, and having their effects upon the phenomenal one. Yet when our work is done, and we look back on the results of our action, we see all as part of a causal and related series of events. The world of phenomena has closed over, and incorporated our modification.

Kant brought moral ideals out of the realm of feeling and made them rational. So did Plato, of course, but Kant was working as strictly as he knew how on the nature of the processes of the human mind. Reason for Kant was the faculty within us which concerns itself with perfection, and under three ideas[1] he sums up the mind's eternal quest. Of these the first

[1] Summarized by Professor C. C. J. Webb in his little *History of Philosophy*, p. 195. H. U. L. Dent.

was the search for the ever-receding goal of science, the 'first cause.' The second was the knowledge of the human spirit towards which we must move from the knowledge we have of consciousness in its momentary fragments. The third is the knowledge of the nature of an all-embracing reality which he calls God, a very different use of the word from that which he employs in his moral discussions. The mind is committed by its nature to these quests, and prevented by its nature from ever completing them.

Yet in spite of this magnifying of reason, as Professor Webb points out, Kant did not end by agreeing with Aristotle that man's highest activity was the disinterested pursuit of knowledge. He held that this was natural to but few, and necessarily restricted to a small number of people.[2] Moral action, the concern of all, for which all had sufficient light, was the highest activity of the human spirit.

The first great revolution against the general lines of his theory of knowledge has been reserved for our own day. The new realists, of whom the most picturesque figure is Mr. Bertrand Russell, revive the old belief that things do exist in themselves and quite apart from our perception of them, but as we know them. The mind is for them but a 'thing among things.' But even in this school, inasmuch as they are a conscious reaction from him, the influence of Kant is very much alive.

Much of Kant's work, it is safe to say, can never die so long as the tradition of our civilization endures. He used the critical method more consistently than any other thinker since Socrates, and revealed its illimitable possibilities as a positive method of discovering truth. Thus he has justified the Liberal attitude in religion for ever. The part played in knowledge by the activity of the mind seems finally recognized as the result of his work. In this he was the pioneer of psychology. He has established the place of faith in the life of the human spirit, though we no longer take for granted the sharp distinctions of his theory of knowledge. The rational nature of morality found in him its epoch-making champion. From his philosophy of Beauty, such thinkers as Croce have their beginnings.

[2] There was in Kant nothing of intellectual arrogance, though his lines were too sharply drawn as a rule, and he was not altogether free from the dogmatism he dreaded so much, especially in his estimates of his brother philosophers.

Much of our modern social philosophy may be traced to him. He taught that all men were free, that right judgment was possible for all and attainable by a rational process which was in essentials the same for all. If justice is reasonable, it can be appreciated, and must be served by all rational people. Humanity is a community of free beings capable of enlightening each other, for each man's moral discoveries are stages in a rational process, and must, through such process, become apparent to his fellows. Such a conception constituted a common rational basis for moral progress. Psychology has much more to say about the practical difficulties of man's moral development than Kant ever dreamed of. But broadly speaking, this philosophical position of Kant's remains the foundation of the social philosophy of Green, Bosanquet, McIver, and others. In practical politics it is the assumption underlying the political faith that describes itself as belief in reform by constitutional methods.

The lasting importance of Immanuel Kant lies, not in the finality of any of his results, so much as in the opening up of many paths which lead man to the knowledge of himself.

MR. CHESTERTON AS A HISTORIAN

By the Rev. J. C. Hardwick, M.A., B.Sc.

AS a popular literary critic Mr. Chesterton has few superiors. His books on Browning and on Dickens are in their way masterpieces of lucid exposition. *Orthodoxy* and *Heretics* not only provoke thought and dissipate popular superstitions, but are also highly amusing. In addition there stand to Mr. Chesterton's credit many delightful essays and some very ingenious and entertaining romances. It is as an historian that we take exception to him. He must not be taken seriously, and yet this, we fear, is what too often happens, as in his *Short History of England*, where few of his readers have enough knowledge to be able to detect his errors and mis-statements. Probably Mr. Chesterton would disclaim a desire to be taken seriously in any pedantic sense; there is a poetic, or rhetorical licence permitted to the purely literary man who invades the fields of history, where specialists are so erudite and so cautious that

they are apt to be intolerably dull for ordinary readers. However, we are not concerned with the *Short History* now, and perhaps the public have ceased to read it. The book we are concerned with here is his recently published popular monograph on St. Francis.[1]

It is a brilliant performance. It is written *con amore*, and the figure of the Little Poor Man, the whole-hearted disciple of Jesus, the lyric poet, the lover of every individual human being, the mystic rapt by transports of divine joy, lives again—so far as he can live for a more prosaic and utilitarian age. In fact we may say that here we have a picture of St. Francis himself which is true and convincing; and, what is more, will seem convincing even to the plain Philistine into whose hands (we may hope) the book will fall for his good.

What, then, is there to find fault with here? Surely, to have performed the hard task of presenting a saint to a materialistic, or what is still more difficult, to a sentimental, age like ours (for we are a combination of both) is to deserve thanks and not censure, praise and not criticism?

We do indeed gladly admit that this is so. Yet we cannot be grateful for so much without wishing that we could have been grateful for more. What we lament is not that St. Francis himself is drawn amiss, but that he is placed in a false setting, so that the whole significance of this great and profoundly attractive personality is misread. St. Francis is here presented as an idealist living in a golden age, a happy sojourner in a sunny, Italian, mediaeval landscape, with a beneficent priesthood in the background. But golden ages produce no idealists; the idealist is always at war with his environment, and the priests and politicians are afraid of him, and compass his ruin where they can no longer ignore him.

Mr. Chesterton's attractive picture of the Saint of Assisi is not unlike Renan's Galilean idyll, and is vitiated for the same reason. It is true that Renan is 'rationalistic,' while Chesterton, like St. Luke, loves a good miracle; but this difference is an irrelevant one. Both alike draw a saint and set him in an unconvincing environment. Of the two presentations, indeed,

[1] *St. Francis of Assisi*, by G. K. Chesterton. (Hodder and Stoughton People's Library, 2/6 net.)

Renan's is the better; for he does not idealize the Pharisee, and this is just what Mr. Chesterton is guilty of. For him the mediaeval Church was the kind mother; yet it can be said of the Church that it killed St. Francis, though it acted with greater subtlety than Caiaphas; it blessed and patronized, and in so doing rendered innocuous the new spirit. It canalized the waters of life to work the ecclesiastical machinery.

For the thirteenth century was, as Mr. Chesterton points out, an age full of new life, religious and intellectual. It was as much a new age as was the period of the Renaissance. But as to why it was a new age, Mr. Chesterton seems to us fundamentally misleading, and it is just because he is misleading here that he misrepresents the significance of St. Francis. He writes:

> 'It was the end of a penance; or, if it be preferred, a purgation. It marked the moment when a certain spiritual expiation had been finally worked out and certain spiritual diseases had been finally expelled from the system. They had been expelled by an era of asceticism, which was the only thing that could have expelled them' (p. 26).

The 'spiritual diseases' above referred to, for which the nightmare of the Dark Ages was a purge, were the sexual excesses and perversions which seem to have characterized certain elements of pagan society at certain periods.[2]

> 'It was no metaphor to say that these people needed a new heaven and a new earth; for they had defiled their own earth and even their own heaven. How could their case be met by looking at the sky when erotic legends were scrawled in stars across it . . .
>
> 'Nothing could purge this obsession but a religion that was literally unearthly. It was no good telling such people to have a natural religion full of stars and flowers; there was not a flower, or even a star, that had not been stained. They had to go into the desert where they could find no flowers or even into the cavern where they could see no stars. Into that desert and that cavern the highest human intellect entered for some four centuries; and it was the very wisest thing it could do.'

[2] *Cf.* pp. 27-31. *E.g.* 'The wisest men in the world set out to be natural; and the most unnatural thing in the world was the very first thing they did. The immediate effect of saluting the sun and the sunny sanity of nature was a perversion spreading like a pestilence. The greatest and even the purest of philosophers could not apparently avoid this low sort of lunacy.' (Does Mr. Chesterton believe that Socrates' accusers were right after all?) Again: 'What had happened to the human imagination, as a whole, was that the whole world was coloured by dangerous and rapidly deteriorating passions; by natural passions becoming unnatural passions.'

Now this is true enough up to a point. The old civilization perished, we may say, through its own moral corruption; through malaria; through barbarian invasions; through continued civil war; through over-taxation of the able, honest, and industrious for the benefit of the inefficient, idle, and vicious; these factors contributed in consummating its ruin. Yet it is a fantastic untruth to represent the Dark Ages as an expiation in any other sense than that the barbarism which follows the collapse of any civilization is an expiation for the sins of that civilization. It could indeed with more fairness be urged that the Dark Ages were themselves quite unrivalled in moral corruption. The Greeks, no doubt, did their best, but in any rivalry of degradation the barbarians could equal, if not outstrip, them.

If we attempt to realize the moral condition of the society of Western Europe between the downfall of the Roman Empire and Charlemagne, it would appear that Mr. Chesterton's simile of dwellers in a cavern is singularly apposite.[3] The tedious and repulsive pages of the chroniclers of the times display a uniformity of abject vice and superstition.

> 'The mind is fatigued by the monotonous account of acts of violence and of fraud springing from no fixed policy, tending to no end, leaving no impress upon the world . . . All classes seem to have been equally tainted with vice,' says the Historian of European Morals.[4]

So much for the life of expiation in the cave. It should indeed be added that the age was in a certain sense eminently religious. 'All literature had become sacred. Heresy of every kind (with thought of every kind?) was rapidly expiring. The

[3] Has Mr. Chesterton read Anatole France's *Thais*? All dreamers should peruse this bit of eremitical realism.

[4] Lecky, vol. ii, p. 236. He quotes Gibbon on the period of the Merovingian dynasty: 'It would be difficult to find anywhere more vice or less virtue.' Also Hallam: 'The facts of these times are of little other importance than as they impress on the mind a thorough notion of the extreme wickedness of almost every person concerned in them, and consequently of the state to which society was reduced.' Milman observes that barbarism had introduced into Christianity all its ferocity and none of its generosity, while Christianity had given to barbarism hardly more than its superstition and hatred of heretics and unbelievers. 'Throughout, assassinations, parricides, and fratricides intermingle with adulteries and rapes' (*History of Latin Christianity*, vol. i, p. 365).

priests and monks had acquired enormous power, and their wealth was inordinately increasing.'[5]

To return to Mr. Chesterton's romance:

'The historic importance of St. Francis and the transition from the twelfth to the thirteenth century, lies in the fact that they marked the end of this expiation. Men at the close of the Dark Ages may have been rude and unlettered and unlearned in everything but wars with heathen tribes, more barbarous than themselves, but they were clean.' (p. 33).

This is delightfully romantic, but it is not history. Paul Sabatier draws a less attractive picture of the *mise-en-scène* of the Franciscan drama.

'Let us picture to ourselves the Italy of the beginning of the thirteenth century with its divisions, its perpetual warfare, its depopulated country districts, the impossibility of tilling the fields except in the narrow circle which the garrisons of the towns might protect; all these cities, from the greatest to the least, occupied in watching for the most favourable moment for falling upon and pillaging their neighbours; sieges terminated by unspeakable atrocities, and after this, famine, speedily followed by pestilence to complete the devastation. Then let us picture to ourselves the rich Benedictine abbeys, veritable fortresses set upon the hill-tops, shielded by their inviolability . . . .'

That there was an awakening is true; and it was a release. But it was a release not from a cave of purgation and expiation, but from a prison—a prison where soul and mind were starved, and enslaved. And the gaoler had been the Church.

'The great movement of thought of the thirteenth century is above all a religious movement, presenting a double character—it is popular and it is laic. It comes out from the heart of the people, and it looks athwart many uncertainties at nothing less than wresting the sacred things from the hands of the clergy.

'The conservatives of our time who turn to the thirteenth century as to the golden age of authoritative faith make a strange mistake. If it is especially the century of saints, it is also that of heretics. We shall soon see that the two words are not so contradictory as might appear . . . .

'There was a genuine attempt at a religious revolution, which, if it had succeeded, would have ended in a universal priesthood, in the proclamation of the rights of the individual conscience.'[7]

The Church, with a perhaps unconscious, but essentially self-preservative instinct, took the new religious movement

[5] Lecky, *op. cit.* vol. ii, p. 239.
[6] *Life of St. Francis of Assisi*, p. xix.
[7] Sabatier, *loc cit.*

under its protection. But this spiritual renaissance was a spontaneous thing; though fathered by the Church, the Church had not been its parent. Thus the new religion (for it was nothing else) was strangled at its birth. Instead of being crucified, its prophet was canonized. This was a more excellent way. Thus it is true that St. Francis was, so to speak, 'thrown up' by a movement which was an awakening: but Mr. Chesterton has misread both the significance of that awakening and of the nightmare which it succeeded. He says the nightmare was a purgation, and the awakening a sense that the world and man were at last purified. The truth is that the nightmare was a dark chaos when religion, morality, and knowledge were stifled and overwhelmed, and the awakening was a spontaneous awakening to the significance of these things. If the cause of the awakening be asked for, the only reply is, 'The wind bloweth where it listeth; thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh, nor whither it goeth.' We can only say that the awakening was in spite of, and not because of, the great ecclesiastical corporations. The authority of the Church, as always, was suspicious of new movements. The priests broke St. Francis no less than they broke Roger Bacon. All that differed was their method: to bless is sometimes more deadly than to curse.

Mr. Chesterton's treatment of the 'miraculous' elements in the life of St. Fancis is what one would expect. The subject is not worth very much space, as the method is common enough and has been often refuted. Still, there is a virtue in repetition.

Mr. Chesterton alludes to a certain prejudice.

> 'It is indeed to a great extent a prejudice of the past; a prejudice that is plainly disappearing in days of greater enlightenment, and especially of a greater range of scientific experiment and knowledge . . . . I mean, of course, what used to be called the belief "that miracles do not happen," as I think Matthew Arnold expressed it, in expressing the standpoint of so many of our Victorian uncles and great-uncles.'

The refuge of the Sophist is ambiguity. There is here no definition of 'miracle.' Are we to accept the traditional meaning of the word which, according to Thomas Aquinas, signifies 'something that takes place through agencies *outside the order*

of the whole of created nature.'[8] If so, Matthew Arnold's *dictum* (if it be his) still remains true. If, on the other hand, we are to understand by a miracle merely some wonderful or 'inexplicable' event, like a sudden cure, a pre-cognition, a telepathic message, and so forth, there exists no widespread prejudice against them. The evidence for them is, in many cases, incontestable. But belief in the abnormal is not to be confused with belief in 'miracle' in the traditional sense of the word.

M. Sabatier, whom Mr. Chesterton might have followed here, makes the whole matter clear in his Appendix on the *Stigmata*:

> 'If by miracle we understand either the suspension or subversion of the laws of nature, or the intervention of the first cause in certain particular cases, I could not concede it . . . The question changes its aspect if we call miracle, as we most generally do, all that goes beyond ordinary experience.'

Another instance of sophistry, and we have done. Mr. Chesterton, speaking of the records, says:

> 'I do not quite understand on what principle one is to pick and choose in the chronicles of the past which seem to be all of a piece . . . . I have never been quite clear about the nature of the right by which historians accepted masses of detail from them as definitely true, and suddenly denied their truthfulness when one detail is praeternatural. I do not complain of their being sceptics; I am puzzled about why the sceptics are not more sceptical . . . They will write for instance: "Monkish fanaticism found it easy to spread the report that miracles were already being worked at the tomb of Thomas Becket." Why should they not say equally well: "Monkish fanaticism found it easy to spread the slander that four knights from King Henry's court had assassinated Becket in the cathedral"?'

This tacitly assumes, what is not the case (and what Mr. Chesterton perfectly well knows not to be the case), that all documentary evidence is equally trustworthy. It is perfectly legitimate to regard an early document as more 'objective' in its statements (more veracious, in fact) than a later document. Or again, one document might be written by a partizan, and another by an embittered opponent. Indeed these considerations are so elementary as to occur spontaneously to the average boy in a fourth form. In the case of St. Francis, as is perfectly well known to Mr. Chesterton, there is an extraordinary wealth of

[8] *Aliquid dicitur esse miraculum, quod fit praeter ordinem totius naturae creatae. Summa Theologica* I, i. cx. 4.

documentary evidence of every period, earlier and later. And the Franciscan documentary evidence is extraordinarily interesting just for this reason that here we can actually witness the process of the growth of myth. In the case of the *Stigmata*; in the earliest account they were *marks*; in an account two years later they became *growths*, and subsequently we may read not only of 'holes made by the nails,' but of 'the nails themselves, made of the saint's own flesh.' Later on the nails were described as of a black colour, and 'if they were pressed from one side, at once they pushed out on the further side, as if they were solid right through.' The wound in the side too was similarly elaborated and 'resembled a beautiful rose.' Eventually indeed 'his right side was so open, and so sprinkled with gore, that even the hidden and inward parts of the heart could be quite clearly seen'! As for the wounds on hands and feet, they were 'continuously emitting blood.'[10]

We must regret that Mr. Chesterton's versatile genius prompts him to write propaganda instead of history. His brilliance enables him to do this in a fashion calculated to mislead the general public. However, a *nemesis* awaits all such deceptive methods. Yet at the same time the book should be read, for in many ways it is a masterpiece. As we said above, St. Francis himself lives in these pages. Yet to love the saint of Assisi is not to love Roman Catholicism. Rather it is to hate every form of ecclesiastical tyranny, untruth, and worldliness.

[9] See the Appendix to J. M. Thompson's *Miracles in the New Testament*, pp. 222 *ff.*

THE RESURRECTION OF JESUS CHRIST

By the Editor.

THE Modernist asserts that he believes in the *fact* of the Resurrection of Jesus Christ, but that he cannot make an affirmation as to its *mode*. The Traditionalist often fails to understand this distinction, or if he understands it, he declines to regard it as valid. How is it possible, he asks, that anyone can believe in the *fact* when he is not clear as to its *mode*? If I did not believe in the Empty Tomb, he exclaims, I could not believe in the Resurrection, yet you Modernists tell me you do not know whether the Tomb was or was not empty on the first Easter Day, and that even if it were empty there are other ways of accounting for its emptiness than by the Resurrection. That is so, answers the Modernist, for it would seem that there are three different views of the mode of the Resurrection suggested by the various conflicting references to it in the New Testament.

Some of these references suggest that the Resurrection was a resuscitation of Christ's physical body—a re-animation of the body in which He died. This *resuscitation-theory* is set forth in Article IV, which claims to be based on Holy Scripture:

> 'Christ did truly rise again from death, and took again His body, with flesh, bones, and all things appertaining to the perfection of man's nature; wherewith He ascended into Heaven.'

Christ after His crucifixion appeared to His disciples in a body of flesh and blood, bearing the *stigmata* of the Passion, and in that body He ate and drank with them.

Secondly, there is the *Vision-theory* of the mode of the Resurrection, namely, that Jesus appeared to His apostles as He did to St. Paul on the road to Damascus, or as He did to St. Stephen at his trial, or to John the Seer at Patmos. The visions of the Risen Lord to the apostles, it is contended, were objective not subjective, not illusions or hallucinations, but real manifestations of the presence of their Crucified Master which comforted, assured, and inspired them. These visions were of the kind for which, it is maintained, modern psychical research has accumulated a great weight of evidence.

Then there is the *transmutation-theory* of the Resurrection as we seem to have it related in the Fourth Gospel. The physical body of Jesus while reposing in the Tomb was transmuted miraculously into a spiritual body, leaving the grave-clothes undisturbed and the napkin that was about His head lying twirled on the slab by itself. In that spiritual body Jesus passes through doors and walls: He is present when the disciples believe Him to be absent: He appears and disappears at will.

If this third view had not been the latest written and by one whose Gospel in certain important respects has not the same claims to historicity as the Synoptists, the Modernist might well find himself able to accept it as *the mode* of the Resurrection. It is extraordinarily circumstantial. Since, however, we no longer believe in the raising of our buried bodies from the grave at the Last Day and their transmutation into spiritual bodies, but yet believe that our resurrection will be after the pattern of our Lord's, we find it difficult to believe in the transmutation of His fleshly body into a spiritual body. It is this combination of historical uncertainty and speculative difficulty which prevents Modernists from whole-heartedly accepting the mode of the Resurrection which seems in some ways so congruous.

Yet though the Modernist is doubtful about the mode, he is convinced of the fact, of the Resurrection. But why should he be convinced of the fact?

His reasons for his conviction fall into two classes. The first class consists of those reasons which compel him to believe in a future life—if not for all human beings, at least for the noblest and best of mankind, and so of course pre-eminently for Jesus Christ. These reasons may be called *speculative*. They are admirably set forth in such books as Professor Pringle-Pattison's *The Idea of Immortality* or in Professor A. E. Taylor's essay, 'The Belief in Immortality' (in *The Faith and the War*, edited by Dr. Foakes-Jackson), although these philosophers are by no means in complete agreement in their enunciation of them. The second class of reasons deal with the evidence for our Lord's survival of His crucifixion and His manifestation of Himself to His disciples. These reasons may be called *historical*.

The present writer can only give these speculative and historical reasons very simply and briefly.

Our first reason is the outcome of our conviction in the rationality of the creative process; the belief that the universe is the product of a mind. If the creative process be rational it must produce something worthy of all the stress and strain, the suffering and sorrow, which the process involves. *Parturiunt montes, nascetur ridiculus mus*, may be a humorous proceeding, but it is certainly not a rational one, unless it be that the mouse, just because it belongs to a higher order of being than the mountains, affords a satisfying reason to rational beings for the process which has produced the mouse. Viewed in its physical or phenomenal aspect the creative process promises no adequate rational consummation. This is because it promises nothing permanent—no enduring values. There seems to be a general agreement among scientists that our earth (and for the matter of that the whole solar system) will end its cosmic history in the same condition as the moon. The moon is without life and is incapable of supporting it.

The words of Prospero, as his actor-spirits vanish, are those of modern science as it views this earth:

> 'The cloud-capp'd towers, the gorgeous palaces,
> The solemn temples, the great globe itself,
> Yea, all which it inherit shall dissolve;
> And like this unsubstantial pageant faded,
> Leave not a rack behind.'

This is dramatic, nay tragic, but it is not rational, unless as in the masque in *The Tempest* the actors are all spirits—immortal spirits moving among the things of sense and time, but surviving their wreck. The rationality of the creative process is, so far as our knowledge of it goes, only arguable if it be producing something which is permanent and therefore non-material. Human personalities, if they are immortal, fulfil the conditions: nothing else, that we know of in the creative process, does. Human personality is the highest, as it is the latest, product of the terrestrial evolutionary process, and it is not unreasonable to assume that it is the main purpose of that process and that it is destined therefore to survive it. If this be not the case, it is impossible to justify the process as rational. Therefore our belief in the rationality of the creative process is bound up with our belief in human immortality, and so with our conviction

that our Lord passed through the gate of death into a higher sphere.

Moreover, the Resurrection of Jesus Christ is demanded by our belief in the morality of the creative process. Though there be a certain rough justice manifest in the present scheme of things, yet is it full of injustice as the Wise Man observed, and this is particularly so in the case of the martyrs and heroes of humanity, who give their lives for great causes or for their fellow-men. Morality demands a full reward for such, but obviously it cannot be conferred in this sphere: their act of self-sacrifice rendered that impossible. Neither will the thought,

> 'To live in hearts, we leave behind
> Is not to die,'

satisfy our sense of justice for such. Morality demands that these martyrs and heroes should survive into another sphere, where they shall see of the travail of their souls and shall be satisfied. If therefore the creative process be moral, Jesus, King of Martyrs as He is King of Saints, must after His death on the Cross have passed to His reward in the eternal world.

Belief in the Resurrection of Jesus Christ is also bound up with our belief in the reality of religious experience. If communion with God be a reality; and if God be what He seems to us to be in that experience, it becomes impossible for us to believe that death can sever that communion by the extinction of the personality of one who has enjoyed God's presence and grace and guidance in this life. The Psalmists of Israel reached the conviction, or rather hover on its edge, by this pathway of conscious communion with God. The author of Psalm lxxiii sings:

> 'Yet am I continually with Thee:
> Thou holdest my right hand,
> Thou shalt guide me with Thy counsel,
> And afterward shalt take me with glory.
> Whom have I in heaven?
> And having Thee there is nought
> that I desire upon earth.
> Though my flesh and my heart should have
> wasted away,
> God would be the Rock of my heart and
> my Portion for ever.' (vv. 23—26).

This, as Dr. Burney remarks, describes 'a conscious rising towards the ideal of communion with God which overpasses the thought of death.'[1]

[1] *Outlines of O.T. Theology*, p. 129.

In the life and personality of Jesus Christ, we see the ideal of perfect communion with God, and it becomes impossible unless we regard this experience as an illusion, or rather delusion, to believe that the death on the Cross can have terminated communion with God in His case.

Psychical research, anthropology, and metaphysic, may supply us with other speculative arguments which lead us to believe in the resurrection life, but these three lines of thought I have outlined must suffice here and now for the speculative approach to the resurrection of Jesus Christ. We now turn to the historical proofs, if such they may be called. These are four.

The first piece of historical evidence that we have for the Resurrection of Jesus Christ is a book, or rather that collection of primitive Christian writings known as the New Testament. In referring to the New Testament as evidence for the Resurrection, we do not refer simply to the accounts of the Resurrection which it contains. Those accounts are fragmentary and conflicting: they agree no doubt in the fact that Christ survived death, but not in very much else. But the New Testament testimony to the Resurrection is much more than this. Every page of the New Testament may be said to be radiant with Resurrection light. If the Resurrection had not been believed in by the primitive disciples of Jesus, the New Testament would never have been written. The very existence of the New Testament in the modern world is a testimony to the primitive belief in the Resurrection of Jesus Christ. The attempt to account for that belief, either as the invention of fraudulent apostles, or as a product of the influences of the mystery religions with their *cultus* of dying and rising gods, seems to the present writer less satisfactory than the view that the belief in the Resurrection of Jesus Christ is the product of those apostolic experiences which the New Testament relates.

The second piece of historic testimony to the Resurrection is the Christian Church, the largest and most ancient, and—may we not add?—most promising, society in the modern Western world. This society is the expansion of the little company of the disciples of Jesus—that is an undoubted historical fact. Yet we cannot imagine that little body surviving its Founder's crucifixion, if His disciples had believed that His

career—'we hoped that it was He which should redeem Israel'—had terminated on the Cross. The existence, the expansion, the vitality, the push and drive of the Christian Church are the outcome of its conviction that Jesus its Head was alive for evermore and had the keys of death and of Hades.

The third piece of historic testimony to the Resurrection of Jesus is not a book or a society, but a rite or ceremony; that rite which is variously known in the New Testament as the Breaking of Bread, the Lord's Supper, the Communion of the Body and Blood of Christ. What is this rite? It is, we know, a commemoration of the death of Christ on the Cross. The consecrated bread symbolizes the broken body: the consecrated wine the outpoured blood: the words of consecration take the communicants back to the night of the betrayal. But would the disciples of Jesus have celebrated His death—as they have done from the earliest times (to judge from the Pauline Epistles and the *Acts*)—if His death on the Cross had terminated His career? Certainly not. The Holy Communion is not only a commemoration of a death, but it is a joyful commemoration of it. The rite, early called[2] the Eucharist or Thanksgiving, is celebrated on all the festivals of the Church, not on its fasts; its note is joyousness and thankfulness, and this has always been its note. Can this be accounted for except on the conviction that the death was followed by the Resurrection?

The fourth piece of historic testimony is the Christian Sunday, or, as it was called in primitive times, the Lord's Day (*ἡ κυριακὴ ἡμέρα*). Now Jesus Christ was a Jew: all His apostles were Jews, including St. Paul: the primitive Christian Church was Jewish: even in the Gentile Churches there was a large admixture of Jews drawn from the Diaspora. But the Jewish sacred day or Sabbath was kept on the seventh day of the week. This was *de rigueur* because it was the Jewish conviction that Jehovah had commanded the keeping of that day holy. Hence its observance was the most important of Jewish institutions. But at Troas we find St. Paul assembling with his converts for the Breaking of Bread on the first day of the week (*Acts* xx, 7; *cf.* I *Cor.* xvi, 2; *Rev.* i, 10). How are we to account for a Jew like St. Paul observing the first day of the

[2] See the Epistles of Ignatius, circ. 112 A.D., and the *Didache*, dated even earlier, by Lightfoot.

week as a sacred day? This is most naturally accounted for on the ground that the first day of the week had been hallowed for them by Christ's Resurrection on that day, as the New Testament narratives of His appearance to His disciples after His crucifixion indicate.

Thus the existence in this modern world of the New Testament, the Church, the Eucharist, and the Lord's Day, are historic testimonies to the Resurrection of Jesus Christ, and have been so for nearly 1,900 years. Had Jesus not convinced His primitive disciples of His triumph over death, none of these things would or could have come into existence. And without being homiletic, it may not be amiss to add that the reverent and intelligent use of these four things will do more than anything else to help modern men to hold fast to the faith of the Resurrection and to cultivate that ideal of life which St. Paul presses upon his Corinthian converts at the conclusion of his exposition of his doctrine of the Resurrection.

> 'Wherefore, my beloved brethren, be ye steadfast, unmoveable, always abounding in the work of the Lord, forasmuch as ye know that your labour is not in vain in the Lord.' (I Cor. xv. 58.)

THE IDEA OF REVELATION

By Professor W. R. Matthews, D.D., Dean of King's College, London.

> 'Out of heaven he made thee to hear his voice that he might instruct thee; and upon earth he showed thee his great fire; and thou heardest his words out of the midst of the fire.'—*Deut.* iv, 36.

IN these words the writer of *Deuteronomy* is giving the foundation and the sanction of the Jewish law. They contain his answer to two questions: Why should the law be obeyed? and: How do we know it? The answer is simple. The law is supreme because it comes from above, from God. 'Out of heaven he made thee to hear his voice': and we know that it is God's law because it was miraculously promulgated. It was attested by supernatural wonders, 'upon earth he showed thee his great fire.' In other words, the Jewish state and nation was a Theocracy. Its statutes and ordinances were supposed to be the direct commands of God.

Research into the early history of mankind has shown beyond doubt that the Hebrews were by no means unique and peculiar in this belief. So far from that, it is the common and ordinary view of people who are passing from barbarism to civilization that their laws were divine in origin; and no small part of the reverence for law, which was essential to the development of orderly social life, and therefore of progress, was due to this belief.

We cannot help contrasting the idea of law put before us in our text with that which prevails in the most advanced communities to-day. We take for granted, perhaps too readily, that the source of law is the will of the community, and its authority derived from that alone. To speak of God's voice having pronounced a law from heaven would be considered a tasteless impertinence in any legal discussion. The contrast is there plainly enough. For the Hebrews law came from above: for us it comes from below. And if there are still some who pretend to bridge the gulf by the saying *vox populi vox dei*, they only show that their God is the people.

But this contrast between the Old Testament idea of law and the modern one extends over a much wider field. It is to these wider implications that I invite your attention this evening. Does it not hold good of the things that lie deeper than law? Is it not equally true of the ideas that are the source of law and the foundations of life? We may take our moral standards, the ideals and aims which we apply to life: nay, we may take our religious ideas, the conceptions that we have of God, and see that same contrast exemplified. It used to be assumed that these were derived from above. Here we had the authentic voice of God on which to rely. But can we with equal confidence make that assumption now? Can we even say that we can give any definite meaning to it? To us the question comes with a force that it never had before: From heaven or of men? From God or from man's mind?

There are two reasons which would seem to lead us to reply that they are of men, even the ideas of good and the thoughts of God have not come from the heavens. They, like law, have grown up from below, created by the busy intellect of man.

The first reason is a very simple one. It is that we live in a different world from that which was the background of the

earlier times. To the writer of *Deuteronomy* and to his hearers, there was no difficulty in thinking of the voice of God from heaven. For them God really dwelt in heavenly places beyond the sky. From His throne above he looked down upon the earth and its inhabitants. But that picture of the world is gone beyond recall. Where is heaven? We cannot divide the universe of space into two parts, or think of God living somewhere outside the world. And the second reason is not less obvious. We have learned the fact that events are continuous. There is no event which cannot be historically investigated: nothing which cannot be connected with what went before. The law of Moses itself, with which our text is concerned, did not in fact come whole and complete into the world—a gift from outside by a transcendent God. We can see how it was produced by historical processes and grew to its full development by human means. Law, morality, religion, are they not all from men?

We put our finger here upon the worst difficulty of religion for the present day in its most general form. Have you not felt it? What is it that we demand from religion? What is it that we expect, and the lack of which would make us give up religion? We ask for a guide, a sure guide, in this perplexing world. We ask to be assured that there is a road for our feet, an eternal and certain road. And we ask for comfort, for some sure power on which to rest: let there be something that abides, though everything else changes and passes. We need God and the voice of God for our support and light: just as much as the Hebrews we wish to believe that God hath made us to hear his voice out of heaven. But because we are modern men we cannot find the absolute in time, all is conditioned and relative, the historical explanation and the scientific method will have their way. All that is or is recorded is a part of the unending flux. We ask of our ideals, of our faith itself: From heaven or of men?

My brethren, I want to suggest to you most earnestly that this contrast with which we have been working so far is false and illusory. Whenever you are presented with an alternative, an 'either or,' and commanded to accept one or the other, it is wise to beware. There is generally a fallacy lurking in the background. And this alternative Either from heaven Or of men is a most pernicious source of error. We need not accept

either the one or the other alternative alone. Are our moral ideals and our religious beliefs from heaven or of men? The true answer is, *from both.*

They are from men. Every moral and religious insight that has come into the world has come through human experience. That is certain. Equally certain is it that human experience can be connected with the history of the race, it can be, up to a point, explained. There is no unconnected event. History and science have their rights over the whole field. There is no fact however remarkable, no thought however sacred, that they may not investigate and in their manner explain.

Yet that is not all. When we have answered 'of men,' we have told only one side of the truth. While we look at the limited and narrow range of human experience we have left much unsaid. 'From men'; but are we sure that we know what men are? Perhaps men as individuals are linked with a larger life and parts of a wider being. To know Man we must look beyond men. And is not something like that suggested by many vigorous but one-sided movements of our time? What is the significance, for example, of the new psychology and of Christian science? What is the need and the discovery which in their different ways they exemplify? It is surely the discovery that, beyond the narrow bounds of the limited self, there is a source of power and calm, a wider life: and the need of man is to live truly as man, to find means to tread down the barriers and let the wider life flow in.

But this fact which those movements illustrate was there all the time plain enough to see. Its standing witness is not the eccentricities of latter-day fads, but the experience which we all may have when we are concerned with the three great kinds of value—truth, goodness and beauty. Think of what happens to you when you apprehend a truth, or create something beautiful, or gain a new vision of righteousness. The truth was not made by you. If you made it, it would not be true. It was discovered: that is to say, it was there waiting for the apprehension. But even to say it was discovered by me seems to be inaccurate. The great discoverers of truth have known that their part in the transaction was not aptly described by that word. They were passive as much as active. It was not so much that they took hold of truth as that truth took hold of them. Through their

experience the eternal truth entered into them. And much the same is the experience of the great artist. He creates indeed, but not absolutely. The beauty which he has embodied was a part of eternal beauty. It was in heaven, but now, through the experience and the work of the artist, it is also of men.

But people are asking this question most insistently about our Master. Jesus—was He of heaven or of men? And some choose one side of the dilemma, others the other. There are some who say, quite truly, that He is an historical Person and can be explained by historical methods. His teaching can be linked up with previous thoughts, and His life elucidated by the study of the conditions of the time. Jesus is a man, and comes from men. But there are others who point out what Jesus has meant to faith and to the world, and think that they must cling to the other alternative or religion will be lost. Jesus is a supernatural being. Not of men, but from heaven.

But the Church has been wiser than this. Pressed continually to say from heaven or of men, it has steadily said both. Jesus is not merely man (whatever that may mean), nor is He a portent from another world: He is both human and divine, from heaven and of men. And if what we have said about the superhuman and eternal that lies at the root of our lives is true, we may see how this doctrine, often taken as being most mysterious and incomprehensible, is in truth in the highest sense most reasonable. For none of us are, in the strictest sense, merely men, merely human, merely temporal finite passing creatures. Even in the most inconsequent and futile of us there is some gleam of eternal meaning, something of truth, goodness or beauty is expressed which is above time. And when we are confronted with a human life which embodies, not in a stammering way, but fully, consistently and perfectly the idea of goodness; when we are, that is to say, face to face with Jesus: What can we say of Him? Divine and human: God and man: of man, and yet from heaven.

My brethren, the ideas that I have been trying, in a very condensed and imperfect way, to put before you may seem to have mainly an academic and philosophical interest. But that would be a mistake. In reality they are of immense practical importance to us individually and to the life of society. Is it not true, as we have said, that the idea of heaven and the

eternal is fading from men's minds? With this departure of the belief in a sphere beyond the skies and a transcendent God, our eyes and thoughts are fixed exclusively on this world and the things of the present. 'If there is no beyond, let us make this life rich and satisfying': so we have said. The secularization of life has been regarded as a good. I am not one who would exalt the past at the expense of the present, or denounce this age as the worst of ages. But it is true that the fading of the thought of heaven has not enriched our life. It has impoverished it. If there is nothing but flux and change, there is no secure foundation for our hopes and aspirations. We need a voice from heaven.

We cannot return to the old childlike idea. The skies are empty, and the visible throne of God is no special place. We need a new heaven for our new earth. And we have it here in that faith, that flux and change are not the deepest word about this life of ours. There is an eternal meaning seeking expression in time. Out of heaven God is making us hear His voice. In that conviction this earth and life take again their colour and romance. The sky and smiling fields are not meaningless arrangements of atoms or electrons. They are the beautiful garment of God. The story of the human race is not 'a tale told by an idiot full of sound and fury signifying nothing.' With many set-backs and bewildering obstruction it is the progressive expression of an eternal thought. And my life is not a succession of moments without significance. It is the opportunity for the embodiment of the eternal, for the incarnation of truth, goodness and beauty. God is making me hear his voice from heaven, not from the skies, but from the central and changeless heart of the universe. He is speaking to me not out of the fire, but through nature, through beauty and truth, but above all through Jesus and those in whom the spirit of Jesus lives. He is calling me to base my life on the eternal, not on that which passes and perishes. To me as to the Hebrews of the olden time the words are true. 'Out of heaven he made thee hear His voice. Know therefore this day and consider in thine heart that the Lord He is God in heaven above and upon earth beneath, there is none else.'

REPORT ON THE 'GREY' BOOK

Approved by the Council of the Churchmen's Union, May 7, 1924

We wish at the outset to express our hearty agreement with the principles which should underlie Prayer Book Revision as these are enunciated by the editors of the 'Grey' Book in their *Grey Book Pamphlet No. I.* These principles may briefly be summarized as Truth; Intelligibility; Simplicity; Uniformity of Order as a desideratum, though with such permissive variations as are clearly necessary to any general agreement for Revision at all; and a Comprehensiveness which must 'look beyond even the limits of the Church of England itself, and not only towards other Christian bodies, but also towards the large mass of vague, inarticulate, yet quite genuine belief which is practically unattached to any Church.' It is our part to examine, from the Modernist point of view, how far the application of these principles has been achieved in the 'Grey' Book. Our examination is divided into four main sections, *viz.*:

I. The Order of Holy Communion ('Grey' Book, Part I, Sect. I).

II. The Orders of Morning and Evening Prayer with the Occasional Offices ('Grey' Book, Part II).

III. The alternative Collects, Epistles and Gospels ('Grey' Book, Part I, Sect. II).

IV. The suggested 'Short Services for Occasional Use' ('Grey' Book, Part III).

I. The Order of Holy Communion ('Grey' Book, Part I, Sect. I).

We approve the following alterations, with the qualifications stated:

(*a*) The general principle by which the service is divided into sections.

(*b*) The substitution of our Lord's summary of the Law for the Decalogue.

[We approve the 'Grey' Book form, which omits the words 'Hear O Israel, &c.,' which are included in all the other Revision proposals which recommend the above substitution. We should have liked to see added, 'On these two commandments hang all the Law and the Prophets.']

(*c*) The introduction, at an early point in the service, of the Invitation, Confession, Absolution, and Comfortable Words.

i. The Confession omits phrases savouring of unreality, *viz.*, 'most grievously,' 'intolerable,' 'provoking thy wrath and indignation against us.' We approve these omissions, but we think 'against thy Divine Majesty' might have been retained.

ii. We were unable to give approval to the brief alternative form of Confession for which provision is made.

iii. The revised 'Comfortable Words' are excellent.

iv. We do not approve, either from the devotional or liturgical standpoint, the revised position or the use of the three-fold Kyrie, either in the English or in the Greek form.

(*d*) We are glad to see the further provision made for Eucharistic Psalms or Hymns.

(*e*) We also welcome the restoration of the original form in the Nicene Creed, *viz.* 'We believe' and '*Holy* Catholic and Apostolic Church.' In the interest of historical accuracy, we regret that the *Filioque* clause was not omitted.

(*f*) We welcome the arrangement and enrichment of the Offertory.

(*g*) We approve the enrichment of the Prayer for the Whole State of Christ's Church.

(*h*) We approve the new form of the Prayer of Humble Access, and regard the changed position an improvement.

(*i*) Concerning the Proper Prefaces :—

We do not feel that the difficulties of the Proper Prefaces are adequately met by the verbal amendments proposed; freer handling, as in the revised forms for Whitsunday and Trinity, would give better results.

(*j*) We believe that those who value primitive forms of prayer will appreciate this revised form of the Prayer of Consecration, which contains all the characteristic elements of the early Eastern Liturgies, while precluding the doctrine of Transubstantiation.

(*k*) We welcome the fusion of the Prayer of Thanksgiving and the Prayer of Oblation in their amended forms, and the provision made for the recitation of the latter by both Priest and People after the Communion.

(*l*) On hygienic grounds we welcome the Rubric permitting Intinction.

While giving our general approval to the 'Grey' Book Order of Holy Communion, we believe that as the principle of alternative uses is admitted some very simple Communion Office on primitive lines should be composed for use particularly in missionary and colonial work, in which an elaborate liturgical office is less suitable.

II. The Orders for Morning and Evening Prayer, with the Occasional Offices ('Grey' Book, Part II).

We find ourselves in general agreement with the principles of revision set forth in Part II of the 'Grey' Book, save that we should have preferred Evensong rather than Mattins to have been provided with alternative variations.

(*a*) We approve the arrangement and enrichment of the opening Sentences.

(*b*) The forms of Introduction to Morning and Evening Prayer provided as alternatives to the forms in our present Prayer Book, lack the liturgical sequence and dignity which characterise the latter Orders, but are otherwise unobjectionable.

(*c*) The shortened forms of the Canticles as given on pp. 18-20 of the 'Grey' Book (*i.e.* in Part I, *The Order of Holy Communion*) are an improvement. [In the *Jubilate* 'and we are His' (the correct translation) should be read instead of 'and not we ourselves.']

(*d*) In the use of the Psalter we should prefer *one Gloria* at the end of all the Psalms rather than its repetition at the end of each.

(*e*) We approve, as an alternative to the Apostles' Creed, the provision of another 'Confession of Faith' (but would urge the adoption of either 'hath' or 'has' uniformly throughout), and the liturgical use of the Beatitudes, from which, however, we suggest the elimination of the Beatitude of the Blessed Dead as unsuitable in this position in the service.

(*f*) The order for Evening Prayer seems to us to call for no further comment.

Infant Baptism.

The following points call for our approval:—

(*a*) The opportunity to begin the service with the words of the Gospel.

(*b*) The emphasis on parental obligation.

(*c*) The excision of irrelevant Old Testament references.

(*d*) The reference to the Good Shepherd and the prayer for the child's home.

[In the prayer on p. 146, we should prefer 'consecrate' instead of 'sanctify' and 'hallow' in references to the water.]

Confirmation.

We approve this form in general.

Holy Matrimony.

We welcome this form of service as conceding, on all important points, what modern Christian feeling requires.

The Thanksgiving of Parents.

We regard this service as a great improvement on the Prayer Book service of 'The Churching of Women,' particularly in commending the attendance of *both* parents and in making the whole service a Thanksgiving for the birth of a child.

A Form of Confession and Absolution.

If it be desirable to include in a revised Prayer Book any 'Form' for private Confession and Absolution, that suggested by the 'Grey' Book seems to us unobjectionable.

The Ministry to the Sick.

We strongly approve the general scheme of the services gathered under this heading, but regret the exclusion from them of some of the beautiful prayers of our present service, and in particular, the Prayer for a Sick Child.

The Burial of the Dead.

We are glad to observe the omission of Job xix. 25-27 from the opening sentences and welcome the revised Lessons and the additional Psalms, but regret, on account of its associations, that Psalm xc has not been retained as an alternative.

The Service for the Burial of a Child seems to us very suitable, as also the Form of Burial provided for use when the other forms are unsuitable.

III. The Alternative Collects, Epistles and Gospels ('Grey' Book, Part I, Sect. II).

The editors of the Grey Book have made a bold and skilful attempt to introduce system into this part of the Prayer Book. The suggestion of a definite series of thoughts for the Sundays after Trinity, in particular, will appeal to many. We deprecate the use of 'Sundays after Pentecost' for Sundays after Trinity. The choice of Epistles and Gospels is usually very apt. But the proposed new Collects, though in substance excellent, seem to us to fail in respect of style. The old Collects which would be displaced, however slight in substance, are endeared to worshippers by their wonderful rhythm and charm of phrase. A great many, also, would deplore the removal of any of the familiar Epistles and Gospels, even when their appropriateness for the particular Sunday is not apparent. We think that the disturbance caused by so large an alteration would more than counterbalance any gain in definiteness and symmetry which might result from adopting such a scheme. We therefore do not offer any detailed criticism.

IV. Short Services for Occasional Use ('Grey' Book, Part III).

Most of these compositions, whether judged by doctrinal or literary standards, seem to us to be of little merit. The desirable qualities of symmetry, conciseness, and distinction of style are often neglected.

[We mention the 'Litany of Commemoration' on p. 239 as supplying a need of which there is a genuine consciousness in our Church life.]

In concluding our examination of the 'Grey' Book, we wish to state clearly what will have become evident to our readers, namely, that whilst we regard Part I, Sect. I, and Part II as having considerable value from our point of view, so that we prefer them to any of the other suggested revisions available for comparison, we do not advocate the inclusion of the rest in a Revised Prayer Book.

BOOK REVIEWS

PERMANENT VALUES IN JUDAISM*

Mr. Claude Montefiore and Dr. Israel Abrahams are the two outstanding figures in Liberal Judaism. They are most engaging personalities. To meet them once is plainly to find learning and virtue. To meet them again and again during many years is gradually to find hidden treasures of character and a noble kinship with the Christian Spirit. Mr. Montefiore, of course, is pioneer in the inclination among Jews to-day towards Christianity, and he led the way with his *Synoptic Gospels*. Dr. Abrahams, handsomely following, in the Preface of his last book, *Studies in Pharisaism and the Gospels*, Second Series (1924), is able to write: 'I have myself learned so much from Christian scholars in my understanding of Jesus, that if these can derive any trifling help from my work in their understanding of the Pharisees, I shall rejoice at having repaid a small instalment of a heavy debt.' Indeed, we may hope that in both the Christian and the Jewish worlds there is germinating a great repentance—on their side, for the dread part they played, say, at the Christian

[1] *Permanent Values in Judaism.* By Israel Abrahams, Reader in Talmudic, University of Cambridge. Four Lectures delivered at the Jewish Institute of Religion, New York, 1923. (Jewish Institute Press, Bloch Publishing Co., 26 East Twenty-second Street, New York; pp. 99; 75 c.)

Era; on our side, for the cruel part we played, say, in the Middle Ages. These green shoots of charity and conciliation are beautifully visible in certain urbanities which grew up between Dr. Abrahams and our own honoured leader of Modern Churchmen, the late Canon Sanday. Dr. Sanday had written concerning Dr. Abrahams' earlier volume of *Studies, First Series*: 'A book which I believe will mark a distinct step in advance in the whole treatment of this problem . . . We see the spirit of true scholarship at work . . . The writer is above all things a *humanist,* and that in a field where in the past *humanism* has been too much wanting . . . [He is] intent on bringing out really good things, and free from carping disparagement of the other side.' Dr. Abrahams declares these to be 'the gracious words of one of the most gracious of men.' He adds: 'It was a genuine pleasure to win the approval of the late William Sanday, a theologian whose mission to the scholarly world was to inculcate good-will, appreciation, and tolerance tempered by firmness.'

Of course, there is the reverse side of the coin—the native and ingrained unlikeness between Jew and Christian. Let us be clear. A Jew is a Jew, and a Christian a Christian. The Jew's religion courses along his veins; it is in his blood—blood which flows by a proud and unequalled descent through the troubled ages from the Patriarchs. The inner meaning of that racial, that family creed is locked to all visitors, and Christians stand outside. On the other hand, the Jew little knows what is in the soul of the Christian when he surveys the wondrous Cross, when he utters the incomparable words 'Our Saviour.' Thus when you, a Christian, look into the eyes of a Jew, what incredibly different traditions, through near two thousand years, lie *behind* those eyes of his and yours—traditions all along of separation, often of tragedy and pathos! It is true. The past with its alienations is irrevocable. But what we Liberal Jews and Liberal Christians are striving for now is this—that when to-day we meet each other's gaze, we shall look at each other mercifully, humanly, with an immense mutual forgiveness and good-will, and then see what happens. 'God having provided some better thing for us.'

Now to the little book in hand, *Permanent Values in Judaism.* The title has been almost paraphrased by another distinguished leader of Modern Churchmen. 'After all,' writes Dean Inge, 'the Jews have stood by the graves of all their oppressors in turn. Their "survival value" has proved to be greater than that of the Assyrians and Persians, and even of the Romans.' The book consists of four lectures spoken, as stated above, at the Jewish Institute of Religion, New York, early in 1923. They are printed exactly as spoken. Each lecture in delivery lasted an hour. They seem to the present writer to be imbued with a rare wisdom and discernment. These few lines of review could not give more than a hint of their merits, even if the knowledge of the reviewer were equal, which it is not, to the task of doing them full justice. We will try to give the note, or a leading note, of each discourse.

I. The first lecture discusses *The Permanent Value of Primitive Ideas.* The note is—the Past growing into the Present. It is Burke amplified—the Past growing into the Present not in French or English political history, but in human spiritual history. Dr. Abrahams' special point is that the primitive does *not die* and give birth to something altogether *different;* it *lives on* modified, adapted, developed into ever newer and newer, later and later growths. 'The primitive,' he declares, 'is the permanent.' Here are some extracts illustrating the thesis:

> 'It is not enough to feel that primitive ideas make way to advanced ideas . . . . There is always residue of the primitive left; the higher

ideas would be different but for that residue; and not only different but worse. It is the primitive in the advanced that gives the advanced its flavour. It is the abiding, indelible, eternal survival of the past in the present that binds the generations in a true tradition.'

Apply this to the Jewish belief in God.

'For instance, we could conceivably formulate a more ethical, a more absolutely philosophical monotheism than ours [the Jews'], but it would be a monotheism of the head not of the heart, of theory, not of experience. God might be the First Cause, but he would not be the Father. In that trite illustration I have stated my case. If Judaism had not gone through stages in which God was conceived anthropomorphically, we could not commune with Him as we now can . . . . The God of the Jew is not a God of Ethical Culture, or of theoretical Unitarianism, or of any brand-new nostrum. O how worn-out, how obsolete the brand-new would be! Ours is a God of history, and in our conception of Him, our love of Him, our obedience to Him, our history lives and speaks; primitive ideas are still active, informing our present conception with past values.'

Apply it to the conception of Holiness.

'The idea of holiness is a primitive idea, associated with physical fears and taboos, but it developed nobly and spiritually. Holiness is a supreme quality of the soul, it is a spiritual fastidiousness, a rejection of the foul in favour of the fine, a leaning and a longing towards cleanliness and purity. But out of the developed idea of holiness, can we reject the primitive idea of physical avoidance and taboo and contamination? Holiness, in fact, retains and must retain its horror of physical uncleanness . . . Here, assuredly, the primitive has its abiding value. The primitive did not pass and die to give birth to something better; it endured and lived on to give that something better a flavour and a fragrance able to nourish and to refresh.'

II. The second lecture treats *The Permanent Value of Apocalypse.* Two or three extracts will best give the note of it.

'There is a compelling fascination in the apocalypses, visions of the end, dreams which have recurred in the course of man's struggle to learn his destiny. As literature they have a unique quality. There is nothing quite like them. And not merely their uniqueness guarantees their permanent place, for as solid contributions to man's understanding of himself and of history their vitality is hardly open to dispute.'

'As a moral driving force, Apocalypse falls far below Prophecy, far below Pharisaism. Yet its visions of the end are in the true vein, they show God eventually triumphant, though Evil now rule. Evil has its day. Good will have eternity. And Israel will be there to see.'

The lecturer lights up the bravery and endurance in the famous passage of Daniel: 'Our God whom we serve is able to deliver us . . . . and he will deliver us . . . *But if not,* be it known unto thee, O King, that we will not serve thy god, nor worship the golden image which thou hast set up.'

'In this clause, *but if not,* we hear the true heroic note . . . . This note, *but if not,* is scarcely to be paralleled in ancient literature . . . . There is a stupendous implication in the *but if not* of Daniel's associates. They actually seem uncertain not only as to God's willingness, but even as to His ability to save. Their unflinching constancy is all the more amazing.'

III. *The Permanent Value of Philo* is the third subject. Philo as a thinker is ranked very high.

'His positive leadership in thought was so compelling, at all events for a limited period while the West was passing out of paganism, that his place in the hierarchy of constructive philosophers, his permanent value in the progress of human thought, is at least as firmly defined as is that of Plotinus.'

But the note of the lecture, the model put before us is this: The champion of one civilisation expressing the heart of it in terms of another civilization.

'Philo adds the Greek touch to our Hebrew truth; he attaches formal Hellenic beauty to the forceful Rabbinic message.'

'Philo the Jew thus harmonized his Judaism with his Greek surroundings. And this is his permanent value to us. His was a Hebrew soul speaking with a Greek tongue . . . . Can we not have Jewish souls speaking with an English tongue? . . . What Philo did in Alexandria, Samuel the Nagid did in Andalusia, Moses Mendelssohn did in Berlin, Moses Montefiore in Ramsgate, we can and must do in New York and London.'

IV. *The Permanent Value of the Talmud* is the last subject. Here Dr. Abrahams, Reader in Talmudic at Cambridge, is on his own peculiar ground and speaks with singular authority.

'The Talmud is one of the most stupendous products of human genius, of human genius permeated, moreover, with the prophetic touch which finds its most abundant and most appealing expression in works inspired by Judaism and compiled by Jews.'

'The Talmud was the expression of the Jewish genius in literature, religion and life during the period which, roughly speaking, extended from Augustus to Justinian.'

'What the Jew is and will be he owes in large measure to the Talmud, or rather to the spirit which produced it.'

What is of special interest to Modern Churchmen is the modernity which Dr. Abrahams claims for the Talmud in relation to Biblical Criticism. Criticism, for instance, would, at least in part, dissolve the stories of Abraham and of Moses: the Talmud is equal to the emergency.

'"God never made a Covenant with Abraham" and "Moses never climbed Mount Sinai." But these denials, though true, are not fatal; for they miss a sense in which affirmation is true. No Covenant with Abraham? The Talmudic spirit knows of a covenant *with us* [reviewer's italics] . . . There is an Eternal Covenant of promise and righteousness between God and Abraham's seed. Moses did not ascend Mount Sinai? The Talmudic spirit knows of an ascent *by us* [reviewer's italics]. In every age Israel reaches the foot and struggles up the slope . . . . When the Higher Criticism has done its best, a Higher Truth emerges . . . . No Covenant, no ascent? Fidelity to the Covenant and energy in the ascent are Israel's duty and privilege. Beyond the reach of criticism, eternal is the call of these ideals, and the Talmudic spirit set them firm in the heart of every Jew.'

There lies open before the present writer a little book named *Heads of Intercession for the use of Religious*. It is edited by the late venerable Canon Carter of Clewer and is Anglo-Catholic in origin and temper. Two pages are assigned to petitions for the Jews. Here is a sentence whose catholicity we all must respect. The Jews having been spoken of as our Lord's 'own people,' we are bidden 'to love those whom Jesus loved.'

HUBERT HANDLEY.

CORRESPONDENCE

THE DIMINISHING SUPPLY OF ORDINANDS.

To the Editor of the MODERN CHURCHMAN.

SIR,

In most University Sermons that I hear nowadays from Bishops there is usually some moving appeal made for candidates for the Ministry. If it is not the main subject of the Sermon it is brought in by way of peroration. Yet these appeals which it is hardly too much to say seem like S.O.S. signals from a sinking ship do not seem to meet with any liberal response and it might be well to consider some of the reasons which are deterring men from the Ministry of the Church of England.

I have talked the matter over with many friends and I find few reasons which seem to be startlingly new or original. The question has been so much debated that all the reasons alleged seem to be almost platitudinous. This is perhaps because it is easier to give the reasons which are commonly accepted by other people than to express one's own private reasons. Of course the first reason always alleged is financial. I should be unwilling to ascribe such undue weight to what seems so sordid a consideration were it not for the fact that the Ministry does seem to be handicapped here in comparison with other professions. The emoluments of a curacy cannot compare with the salary of a schoolmaster on the Burnham scale, and the latter is much more secure and there is the guarantee of a pension on retirement. The rise of salary is gradual and certain for a schoolmaster. The precariousness of a parson's stipend is a point which I think needs emphasis and I have selected the scholastic profession to compare it with as it is an alternative which is presented to very many men and where, until quite recently at any rate, the scale of salary was generally admitted to be inadequate to the needs of a schoolmaster's life.

Again the Ministry is, I believe, handicapped in comparison with other professions by its method of appointment. It has no Scholastic Agencies, no University Appointments Committee to simplify the task of securing employment.

But neither of these reasons would I think be sufficient to deter from the Ministry men who believed it to be work really worth doing. They are obstacles, but obstacles that could be surmounted. There seems to be really a very wide-spread misconception of what a parson's work is. It is imagined to be a life of rather dull committee meetings where the humdrum affairs of a hopelessly conservative parish are discussed in a rather bickering fashion by pious people and where nothing vital is ever done! As a friend of mine said to me, 'I should have to take charge of a mothers' meeting whereas I should want to send all the mothers to a Babies' Welfare Clinic.' It is not imagined that there is any freedom in a parson's life and the dog-collar is regarded as the symbol of the restraining leash that chokes all the vigorous life in its wearer. As another friend said to me only yesterday: 'The parson's life is neither one thing nor the other. It is not a disciplined brotherhood like the Roman priesthood, bound together by such rules as celibacy, nor yet is it a nice pleasant life for a gentleman as it was a hundred years ago'! Celibacy it would seem

could be faced as the rule of an order, but not as a condition enforced by lack of money. When men advance financial reasons, the appropriate mental comment is '*cherchez la femme.*'

Then there are very many men who are deterred from a sense of moral emptiness. 'I know it is a great work, but I am not fit to do it.' This attitude which is fairly general among a certain section is partly due to the emphasis which has been placed on Vocation. A friend of mine who has decided to take Orders said: 'You know it was only recently that I realised that Vocation does not mean the voice of God in the night.' And while the Ministry has been emphasised as the highest vocation open to a man, it has been also preached that there is a vocation in any work to which a man sets his hand. The teaching and medical professions, life in commerce, in politics, have all been represented as spheres of duty in the service of God. A man often feels that he is not fitted to serve God in what he considers the cramped and fettered work of the Ministry, but responds joyfully to the challenge to bear Christian witness in other work. Though I would not admit that this consideration has conscious weight in men's minds, it is worth pointing out that if a Christian vocation can be followed outside the Ministry as well as in it, there is great temptation to find it in a profession where there is a salary sufficient to keep a family.

Then there are conscientious scruples with regard to belief. Many men feel that they cannot give assent to the Thirty-Nine Articles. They are a very real stumbling-block. 'It seems ridiculous,' a man said, 'that it should matter vitally whether I am orthodox before I enter the Ministry, whereas I can, to some extent at any rate, say what I like when I am ordained.' Only those who are diplomatic enough to believe that the Ministry is great enough work to justify a 'white lie' on entering it, or those whose intellectualism reduces all words to a somewhat mystic symbolism, or again those happy souls who can still keep a childlike faith in a modern world, can surmount this obstacle. The tender in conscience fall at this fence. There are many too who are Modernist in theology, and they find that they have no gospel, which they feel impelled to preach. For them the joy lies in an intellectual search after Truth and they do not believe that a working-class congregation will be interested in the search. This is a very real difficulty for the first-class men, who are really honest in thought. They have a genuine love of the Church through its associations and traditions, but they are not certain whether their own beliefs are going to be the salvation or the ruin of it. They are afraid that their thinking may run counter to the traditions of Christianity and for this reason they hesitate to enter the Ministry. Their thinking will do less harm outside the Church than in it.

There are many others who would not call themselves modernist in theology, but who are yet modern in temper. There is wide-spread scepticism about the need for organised religion and they do not feel themselves called to be the organisers. 'The world is so full of a number of things' —it holds out rich possibilities in every direction—in the life of thought and in practical life, where there is the call to glorious adventure and to ungrudging sacrifice. But the Ministry seems to be a narrow path, where there are restrictions both on thought and on action. Life at twenty seems full of perilous possibilities, but the Ministry only presents a life of dull routine.

None of these considerations taken singly would be sufficient to deter men from the Ministry, but taken altogether their force is overwhelming.

It is the very complexity of the problem that is the difficulty. There are financial, practical, intellectual, and moral obstacles and it is scarcely to be expected that all should be surmounted. It is not surprising in view of this that so few men enter the Ministry; the surprising fact is that any enter at all.

A. P. GRUNDY.

BRASENOSE COLLEGE,
OXFORD.
4th May, 1924.

PSYCHICAL RESEARCH AND THE MODERN CHURCHMEN'S CONFERENCE.

To the Editor of the MODERN CHURCHMAN.

SIR,

As I know that some members of the Churchmen's Union desire Psychical Research to be included in the programme of the Modern Churchmen's Conference on 'The Approach to Religion through Science,' I am writing to ask: Is this subject to have a place? If not, why is it to be boycotted?

Is it because it is not considered to be Scientific? That can hardly be justified.

The names of the Presidents and Vice-Presidents of the Society for Psychical Research, and the names of the Committee of 'l'Institut Métapsychique International' of Paris are sufficient to invalidate such a reason.

Is it because this study is not regarded as an avenue of approach to Religion?

Professor MacBride's article in the December issue of the *Modern Churchman* corroborates the convictions of serious students that Psychical Research has a very important bearing on Religion.

Space does not allow me to go into details, so I am driven to make an assertion which could easily be substantiated, and that is to affirm that the careful critical study of the facts which Psychical Research has proved has been for many the means of removing hindrances to belief, and of re-establishing lost faith in God and the Spiritual Universe.

I hesitated to address this open letter to those responsible for arranging subjects and inviting men of weight to address the Conference; but I was rather moved to do so by a vicar who told me that he thought that Modern Churchmen were prepared to be interested, and this is supported by a private letter I received from a C.U. member.

If I am mistaken in thinking that I am voicing the desire of many, of course I am contented to let the matter drop as far as this Conference is concerned. If I am not mistaken I hope some of our members will say so now, before the programme is irrevocably fixed.

H. A. DALLAS.

INNISFAIL,
CRAWLEY.

THE CHURCH TUTORIAL CLASS MOVEMENT.

To the Editor of the MODERN CHURCHMAN.

SIR,

I venture to crave your permission to call the attention of your readers to the pamphlet on Church Tutorial Classes which is inserted in this number.

The Church Tutorial Class Movement has been at work now for several years and has sufficiently proved that the method which it advocates is practical and satisfactory. It is inspired by the conviction that the pressing need to-day is the diffusion of accurate knowledge and intelligent understanding of the foundations of our religion. The movement has concentrated its chief attention so far on Biblical subjects and is at the present time making a great effort to further the knowledge of the results of Old Testament criticism. I need not urge upon your readers the vital importance of this. We are all convinced that religion can only revive among us if we sincerely love the truth and desire by all means to spread it. I believe that there is no organisation with greater possibilities than the Church Tutorial Classes Association.

I want specially to appeal to readers of the *Modern Churchman* to consider whether they could not help forward this movement. Those who have time and knowledge could render great assistance if they were prepared to act as Tutors. Clergy might enquire whether it is not possible to start a Tutorial Class in their own district, and laity might in many cases stir up their clergy to take an interest in the movement and encourage them to organise a Tutorial Class.

I need hardly add that the movement could be very much more efficient if it had more money. We need subscribers of not less than 5/- per annum to become Associates. With 1,200 Associates we could do really great things.

W. R. MATTHEWS.

KING'S COLLEGE,
LONDON.
1st May, 1924.

A CORRECTION.

TO THE EDITOR OF *The Modern Churchman.*

SIR,

In my review of Troeltsch's religious philosophy in the March number of the *Modern Churchman*, line 71, p. 32 should read: 'Troeltsch's critic maintains that it is *not* polymorphous; and line 4 from the bottom should read: '*Troeltsch* describes it as polymorphous.' These errors crept into the type-written copy of my MSS., but an attentive reader would see the meaning from the context without these corrections.

W. D. MORRISON.

ST. MARYLEBONE RECTORY, W.
7th May, 1924.

THE CHRISTIAN *SHEMA*.

To the Editor of *The Modern Churchman*.

Sir,

In your very fair review of my book, *Essays on Christian Unity*, you misunderstood me at one point.

In dealing with 'The Church—Its Faith,' I did not claim that the Jewish *shema*—'Thou shalt love the Lord thy God, etc.'—might form a sufficient baptismal confession; but rather that, what, in comparison, I ventured to call the Christian *shema*—'Thou art the Christ the Son of the living God'—might do so. I merely wished to make a comparison here between Judaism and Christianity: to claim that when the Jew gave utterance to Deut. vi, 4 and 5, he did not so much repeat a creed as swear an oath of loyalty, and that the convert to Christianity was doing something similar in confessing that Jesus was 'the Christ the Son of the living God' before receiving baptism.

Perhaps I was somewhat obscure, but you will allow me this correction.

Wm. Robinson.

Overdale College,
Birmingham.

THE LONDON ANNUAL GATHERING.

To the Editor of *The Modern Churchman*.

Sir,

The Annual Gathering of the Churchmen's Union for the Advancement of Liberal Religious Thought will be held in London this year on May 27th.

The Corporate Holy Communion will be celebrated at 11.30 a.m. at St. Andrew's Church, Ashley Place, Westminster; the sermon will he preached by the Rev. Dr. J. F. Bethune-Baker, Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity at Cambridge.

The Annual Business Meeting will be held at the Church House, Westminster, at 3 p.m., followed by a discussion on Hymn Book Reform opened by Mr. Geoffrey Dearmer and Mr. A. E. Lynam.

The Public Meeting will be held at the Caxton Hall, Westminster, at 8 p.m., under the chairmanship of Sir Lawrence Jones, Bart., and the speakers will be the Dean of St. Paul's, Dr. Cyril Norwood (Master of Marlborough), Miss Grier (Principal of Lady Margaret Hall, Oxford), and Dr. Douglas White. This meeting is open to all: there is no charge for admission, but a collection is made to defray expenses. I hope that Modernists and all those interested in our movement will make a *real* effort to attend this year. Last year the attendance was most discouraging.

E. St. George Schomberg.

St. Andrew's Vicarage,
Ashley Place, S.W.1.
3rd May, 1924.

HEMEL HEMPSTEAD.—Assistant-Curate Priest wanted. Vigorous or Broad Churchman. Charge of daughter church. Stipend £250 and Whitsuntide Offerings, or Title might be given.—Apply Vicar.



THE VERY REV. WILLIAM RALPH INGE,
D.D., C.V.O., F.B.A., DEAN OF ST. PAUL'S.
President of the Churchmen's Union.

Photo: Blake Studios, 106 New Bond St.]